FEDERAL JURISDICTION: DOMINANT FEDERAL
INTEREST MAY BE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
UNDER the United States Constitution the permissible ambit of
federal court jurisdiction extends to "all Cases... arising under...
the Laws of the United States .

. . ."'

Original jurisdiction to this

effect has been generally conferred on the lower federal courts by
Congress 2 in language almost identical to that of the constitutional
grant. 3 In addition, special jurisdiction containing "arising under"
language has been vested in the federal judiciary under the authority
of specific federal statutes.4 In T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,5 Judge
Friendly of the Second Circuit has in strong dicta proferred a third
jurisdictional basis for such "federal questions" where a claim
"arises under" and thus requires application of "federal common
law."6
U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2.
-Congressional power to delimit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts derives
from its prerogative to "ordain and establish" courts inferior to the Supreme Court
which may exercise the judicial power of the United States. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964). The initial provision for general jurisdiction over federal
questions came in 1875. "[T]he circuit courts of the United States shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity ... arising under the Constitution of laws of the
United States .... ." Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. The current
federal question provision as embodied in § 1331 remains substantially unchanged.
'28 U.S.C. §§ 1337-40 (1964), granting federal courts jurisdiction over "commerce,"
patents and copyrights, postal service and internal revenue, respectively.
Both these special statutes and the general jurisdictional grant in § 1831 contain
"arising under" language. No essential variance in the construction of "arising under"
is noticeable in the individual application of the statutes. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL
(Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
PRAcrcE 1 0.60 [8.-3]
5 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
The Harms case was cited as controlling in Muse v. Mellin, 339 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.
1964), affirming 212 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), involving substantially the same
factual situation.
339 F.2d at 828.
The terse statement of Justice Brandeis that "there is no federal general common
law," Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 804 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), has made the term somewhat
approbrious in judicial lexicon. Judge Friendly shows no reluctance to employ the
phrase in Harms, and has suggested that Erie merely "opened the way to what, for
want of a better term, we may call specialized federal common law." Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 405
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The controversy arose when Eliscu, the owner of a one-third
interest in renewal copyrights ostensibly assigned his interest subject to a judicial determination of ownership. Subsequently, he instituted suit in a state court to have the assignment declared valid. 7
T. B. Harms Co. claimed the copyrights under an allegedly prior
assignment and brought suit for declaratory and equitable relief in
a federal district court.8 Jurisdiction was predicated on section 1338
of the Judicial Code, which confers exclusive federal jurisdiction
over cases "arising under" the patent and copyright laws. 9 No diversity of citizenship existed, 10 and the district court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction under section 1338 on the ground that
the validity of a copyright assignment is solely a matter of state
contract law." The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
claim did not invoke a right conferred by the Copyright Act 12 or

require a construction thereof. In addition, the court stated that
given a proper case a basis for jurisdiction might exist if "a distinctive policy of the [Copyright] Act requires that federal principles
control the disposition of the claim."' 3 Recognizing that there is
a growing body of what may be denoted "federal common law,"' 14
Judge Friendly's opinion asserted that federal jurisdiction might
follow if "'federal common law' governed some disputed aspect of
a claim to ownership of a copyright. .

. ."15

However, the requisite

for this common law basis is a dominant federal interest in the con(1964).

(Emphasis added.)

[hereinafter cited as

See

WRIGHT, FEDERAL

Cou'Ts § 60, at 214 n.6

(1963)

WRIGHT].

7 Suit was instituted by Eliscu in the New York Supreme Court. 39 F.2d at 825.
8226 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
0 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent and copyright cases."

28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a) (1964).
10 Plaintiff Harms is incorporated under the laws of New York and Eliscu is a
citizen of that state. 339 F.2d at 825.
" 226 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
This was not an action for infringement as defined by the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-16 (1964), since infringement has been rather narrowly defined and a
plaintiff must prove two indispensable elements: (1) ownership of the copyright and
(2) copying by the defendant. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 141 (1963). The only dispute in
Harms concerned the ownership of the copyright, a question which turned on the
validity of Eliscu's prior assignment.
12 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964).
839 F.2d at 828.
24 See note 6 supra.
5 339 F.2d at 828.
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tested issue,' and the court concluded that the instant case involved
7
no such interest.'
Fundamental to a determination of which cases "arise under"
federal law is an understanding that the Constitutional and statutory bases for jurisdiction are not coextensive.' 8 The seminal case
in this regard is Osborn v. Bank of the United States,' holding
constitutionally valid a Congressional grant of federal jurisdiction
in all cases where a United States bank is a party.2 0 In that case,
Chief Justice Marshall asserted that Congress could extend jurisdiction to the lower courts under the "arising under" provision of the
Constitution in any case where the construction of the Constitution
or laws formed an "original ingredient" of the case. 21 This broad
demarcation of a permissible jurisdiction was designed to insure
that Congress would have the Constitutional power to extend the
jurisdiction of lower federal courts to any case involving a federal
22
interest.
Prior to the Osborn decision, special statutes had conferred federal jurisdiction upon claims arising under certain specific federal
laws,23 but not until 1875 did Congress grant general federal question jurisdiction to federal courts. This general statute, the forerunner of section 1331, extended the lower court power to claims
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
1

6 Id. at 827-28.
27 "[here is not

the slightest reason to think that any legal question presented by
Harms' complaint falls in the shadow of a federal interest suggested by the Copyright
Act or any other source."

Id. at 828.

is WRIGHT § 17, at 49-50.
10 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
20 The plaintiff bank in Osborn challenged its liability for state taxes. Federal juris.

diction was predicated upon a provision of the bank charter which authorized the
bank "to sue or be sued" in the federal courts. "A more natural interpretation might

have been that the charter gave the bank capacity to be a party to a suit but did not
in itself create jurisdiction." WsuarT § 17, at 49 n.5. In order to reach the constitutional question, however, the charter had to be construed as conferring jurisdiction.
2122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824.
22 "The very expansive reading Marshall gave to the 'cases arising under' language

of the Constitution is appropriate in dealing with a constitution. It leaves room for
Congress to grant such particular jurisdiction as may in the future be seen to be
necessary." WuGsr § 17, at 49.
Such an interpretation was consonant with Marshall's view that the federal system
could survive only if the federal judiciary was the final arbiter of all questions which
might involve the sovereignty of the federal government. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), which also reflects this attitude.
2"E.g., Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, which extended the jurisdiction of

the circuit courts to hear cases "arising under any law of the United States, granting
or confining to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings,
inventions, and discoveries...."
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24

Despite the fact that this provision duplicated the terms
States.
of the Constitutional grant, it has been more narrowly construed
than that ultimate conferral of judicial power.25 General jurisdiction has been upheld only if a construction of a statute, treaty or
the Constitution is required 26 or if an asserted right requires the
27
application of a federal statute.
More recently, however, several dissenting opinions have advanced an expanded theory of federal jurisdiction. In Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co.,28 the plaintiff attempted to
bring an action for a maritime tort under section 1331 rather than
predicating it on federal admiralty jurisdiction. The complaint
characterized the case as "arising under" the laws of the United
States. The Supreme Court held that section 1331 was never intended to apply to maritime cases, 2 9 but in doing so the majority
did not consider Justice Brennan's dissenting contention that claims
based on federal decisional law as well as on federal statutes "arise
30
under" the laws of the United States for jurisdictional purposes.
Act of March 3. 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
A similar statute had been passed earlier, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat.
92, but was repealed shortly thereafter, Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
For an explanation' of the political motivations behind this short-lived statute, part
of the well known "Midnight Judges" Act, see FRANKFURT & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREM COURT 21-30 (1927).
25 The Supreme Court, although purporting to apply the broad test of Osborn to
the grant of general jurisdiction, actually distorted the test into a more narrow form.
E.g., Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248 (1885); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96
0.60 [8.-3]; WRIGHT § 17, at 50. One commentator
U.S. 199 (1877). See 1 Mooa
asserts that there is some evidence of Congressional intent to confer the full jurisdiction
2,

permitted by the Constitution.

See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District

Courts, 53 CoLUmr. L. REv. 157, 160 (1953).
For a discussion of the historical development of the restrictive interpretation of
general federal question provisions, see London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A

Snare and a Delusion, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 835, 841-48 (1959).
20 E.g., National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); In re
Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). See Annot., 12
A.L.R.2d 5, 20 n.9 (1950).
27A
"substantial claim founded 'directly' on federal law" is requisite. Mishkin, supra
note 25, at 165; see WRIGHT § 17, at 52. See generally, Annots., 14 A.L.R.2d 992, 12
A.L.R.2d 5 (1950).
28 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
- The plaintiff contended that cases "arising under the laws of the United States"
include those "arising under" admiralty laws. In rejecting this contention, the majority
indicated that the district court may have jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Id. at
380.
so Id. at 389 (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Brennan was joined by
Justices Warren, Black and Douglas. They contended that the Jones Act was not the
exclusive fount of jurisdiction; rather, a cause of action may "arise under" the body of
case law evolved before the statute's inception.
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"The contention cannot be accepted," he argued, "that since petition's rights are judicially defined ... they are not created by 'the
1
laws ... of the United States' within the meaning of § 1331."'
A similar opinion was issued by Justice Brennan dissenting in
Wheeldin v. Wheeler,32 a case involving alleged violations of both
constitutional and federal statutory provisions in the context of an
improper issuance of a subpoena by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities. The majority opinion upheld jurisdiction by
reasoning that the validity of the claim depended upon construction
of the Constitution. 33 Brennan, however, chose to posit jurisdiction
on the fact that the claim involved an area in which a formulation
of federal common law was desirable. Such a claim, he concluded,
34
would be one arising under the laws of the United States.
Harms represents the first majority opinion sanctioning an expanded jurisdictional concept such as Brennan suggests. Moreover,
Friendly has expressly connected it with the "new and dynamic
doctrine"3 5 which was espoused in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States.36 That case held that the rights and duties of the United
311Id. at 393.

373 U.S. 647 (1962).
33 The action was brought against an investigator of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities for an unauthorized service of subpoena upon the plaintiff. The
plaintiff filed suit in a federal court seeking damages for the public disgrace and loss
of employment allegedly caused by the issuance of the subpoena. A majority of the
Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction of the claim as founded on the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable search and seizure provisions, but rejected this Constitutional contention on its merits. Id. at 649. The plaintiff had alternatively attempted to posit
jurisdiction under 1381 on an alleged violation of the statute which empowered the
Committee to issue "authorized" subpoenas. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 121, 60 Stat.
828 (1946). The majority asserted that there was no jurisdiction to consider this
claim: the statute did not authorize such an action, and as it was in essence an action
for defamation it was controlled by state law. Since the statute provided no remedy,
the Court felt constrained by Brie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to refrain
from formulating one. "As respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law
rights, it is perhaps needless to state that we are not in the free-wheeling days anteThe instances where we have created federal common law are few
dating (Erie] ....
and restricted." 373 U.S. at 651.
3justice Brennan disregarded the Constitutional issue finding the gravamen of
the complaint in the notion of a tort of malicious abuse of federal process by a federal
officer. Id. at 653 (dissenting opinion). Brennan found no infringement of a state.
interest by this abuse; rather the matter was essentially federal and should be adjudicated by the federal courts as "arising under" a federal statute. Id. at 653-55.
82

35 339 F.2d at 827.

(1943). The Clearfield case involved the right of the United States
86 318 U.S. 363
to obtain reimbursement from a bank for a forged government check. Judge Friendly
noted in Harms that the Clearfield doctrine "instructs us that even in the absence
of express statute, federal law may govern what might seem an isssue of local law
because the federal interest is dominant." 339 F.2d at 827-28.
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States on its commercial paper are of such paramount federal interest that in the absence of an applicable act of Congress, the federal
courts will fashion rules governing it according to their own standards.37 Clearfield, moreover, represents but one of a growing
38
number of areas in which federal common law has been fashioned.
If the Clearfield doctrine is indeed destined to expand the scope of
federal common law, it is logical to consider a concomitant expansion of the umbilical area of federal jurisdiction. Such an expansion, however, poses certain problems left unresolved by Harms.
A basic uncertainty inherent in Judge Friendly's opinion is
the desirability of expanding section 133 I's general jurisdiction concomitantly with 1338.39 While in the past the criteria for determining jurisdiction under both have been identical40 and coextension might thus seem logical, there are certain factors which
may preclude such treatment. Section 1331, the general federal
question statute, has never been broadly interpreted and Congress
has given little indication of a desire to expand federal district court
jurisdiction under that provision. 41 Indeed, the recent increase
to $10,000 of the minimum amount in controversy required to
sustain section 1331 jurisdiction indicates that Congress is desirous
3, 318 U.S.

38 E.g.,

at 367.

United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1947) (reimbursement to the government for treatment of injuries inflicted on a soldier); D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 815 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (concurring
opinion) (obligation on a note assigned to a federal agency). More recently, the
Supreme Court has construed § 801 of the Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), as requiring the federal courts
to fashion and apply a federal common law of labor-management contracts. Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 358 U.S. 448 (1957).
See generally WluGHT § 60; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLum. L. Ruv. 489, 530-35 (1954); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. R~v. 797, 798-801 (1957).
" Judge Friendly recognized the problem in his statement that, assuming federal
common law governs a copyright claim, "one would wish to consider whether this
might be founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 rather than on § 1338 .... ." 339 F.2d at 828.
Presumably, then, Friendly thus leaves open the question of expanding § 131 for
future deliberation, and makes no judgment on the efficacy of Justice Brennan's broad
interpretation of the section. See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
4o See note 4 supra.
" Congress specifically narrowed federal question jurisdiction in one instance. Texas
8, Pac. Ry. v. Kirk, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), the Supreme Court had held that tort actions
against railroads operating under a federal charter were within the "arising under" jurisdiction. This decision was explicitly rejected by Congress in the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C. § 1349 (1964), which provides that jurisdiction may not be predicated upon the
grounds of a federal charter unless the United States owns more than half of the
capital stock of the corporation.
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of restricting and reducing district court litigation. 42 Furthermore,
the majority opinions in Romero and Wheeldin may indicate a tacit
unwllingness by the judiciary to allow a broadening of section
1331.43
An extension of the special jurisdiction conferred by section
1338, however, would seem to involve different considerations.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . .. -44 Congress has done so by passing the copyright and
patent laws, 45 and in section 1338 gave the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over cases arising under those laws. 40 In fact, section
1338 is the only jurisdictional provision combining the mandate for
exclusive federal jurisdiction with the "arising under" language. 47
This, when read in conjunciton with the Constitutional mandate,
can be taken to indicate Congressional recognition of a predominant
federal interest in copyrights. Thus, it would not seem unreasonable
to broadly interpret section 1338 as encompassing those copyright
cases involving a strong federal interest.
Unfortunately, however, Judge Friendly does not indicate what
criteria should be utilized in divining the existence of a distinctive
federal interest. He does suggest that the policy reflected by a substantive statute, as well as its specific provisions, should be considered.4 8 In addition, Judge Friendly would also seem to include
Justice Brennan's "common law" thesis49 within his test, at least
insofar as applicable to section 1338.50 Thus Friendly notes that
42 Congress attempted to set an amount "not so high as to convert the Federal
courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial
of petty controversies." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
43Judge Friendly's refusal to consider the merits of an expansion of "arising
under" jurisdiction in § 1331 situations, note 39 supra, is perhaps designed to avoid
the objections to Justice Brennan's thesis which the majority of the Supreme Court
indicated in Romero and Wheeldin. Friendly may thus be implicitly restricting the

scope of his "common law jurisdiction," to the special jurisdictional statutes, §§ 1337-40.
4"U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
'4 Copyrigt Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
"6For the text of § 1338, see note 9 supra.
47 Sections 1337, 1339 and 1340 employ "arising under" language with respect to
cases involving commerce, the postal service and internal revenue respectively. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1339, 1340 (1964). None of these statutes provide for exclusively federal
jurisdiction, however.
48 The minimum necessary to meet Judge Friendly's test is a case "where a distinctive policy of the [Copyright] Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim." 339 F.2d at 828.
,9 See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
5"See note 43 supra.

Vol. 1965: 828]

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

federal common law would govern a claim where "radiations" from
a federal statute gave rise to a dominant federal interest.51
The Harms case, then, provides no guidelines by which to meaure jurisdiction. 2 This vagueness, given the exclusiveness of section 1,338, might work to the prejudice of a plaintiff in certain cases.
Given a factual situation where the "radiations" of the Copyright
Act marginally suggest the existence of a federal interest, a plaintiff
might bring an action in either a state or federal court only to discover after the statute of limitations has run that he has chosen the
wrong forum.5 3 Perhaps this imprecision was intended in order to
allow federal courts broad discretion to determine the existence of a
dominant federal interest on a case-by-case basis, but until a definite
rule is coalesced the jurisdictional uncertainty will lead to forum
shopping and occasional injustice.
r1 339 F.2d at 828.

r2 Judge Friendly seems to go to some length to avoid delineation of a precise
standard. For example, he states at one point that "we would not be understood...
as necessarily agreeing . . . that federal jurisdiction would not exist if a complaint
alleged that a state declined to enforce assignments of copyright valid under federal
law." 339 F.2d at 827. At another point, he declines to comment on whether the
complaint presented in Venus Music Corp. v. Mills Music, Inc., 261 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1958), "presented a question of copyright law sufficient to meet the criteria we have
outlined .... ." 59 F.2d at 828.
11
Perhaps the plaintiff in the hypothetical situation posed could protect himself
by filing suit in both state and federal courts. But a dilemma would arise if both
decided to accept or reject jurisdiction. The logical solution would be a stay of
action in one court until the other decided the jurisdictional question. This, however,
poses the problem of which court should stay its consideration, and this may turn
on whether a "dominant federal interest" is present in the case. The whole problem
would be greatly alleviated by the formulation of a more definite standard, thus
allowing the plaintiff to choose the proper forum with some degree of certainty.

